Introduction
In recent years, a number of western states have faced the challenge of domestic Islamist terrorism (Ragazzi, 2014b; Neumann, 2011; Government of Canada, 2011) . Whilst the term 'terrorism' itself remains highly-contested (Gupta, 2008) , particularly in light of the role played by western powers such as the USA and Britain in Iraq and Afghanistan, western states face the reality of small numbers of their Muslim citizens engaging in domestic terrorist planning and actions. This new threat pre-dates the current Syria crisis and arguably also pre-dates 9/11 and the so-called 'war on terror' (Thomas, 2012) .
A specific response to this threat has been policy approaches aimed to prevent and disrupt attraction towards such Islamist terrorist ideologies and actions, particularly amongst young people.
Britain was an early adopter of such a policy approach in the wake of the 7/7
London bombings of July 2005, which were carried out by four young men brought up in the north of England. This led to the rapid activation of 'Prevent' (DCLG, 2007a and b) , a previously dormant strand of Britain's overall CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy (Home Office, 2003) . Since its inception in 2007, Britain's Prevent strategy has been both significantly influential on policy approaches adopted by other western states and highly-controversial domestically. Richard English (2009) argues that how states respond to terrorism is crucial, with a disproportionate reaction of repression, restrictions on civil liberties and scape-goating of specific communities representing effective victory for the terrorists. From this perspective, the adoption of a policy approach aimed at prevention through community engagement and education should have been a positive development. However, I have previously argued (Thomas, 2009 (Thomas, , 2010 that the reality of Prevent in Britain has been highly problematic, and possibly even counter-productive, in the way it has been conceived and implemented. That broad critique contended that Prevent has stigmatised entire Muslim communities, has blatantly contradicted the new approach to multiculturalist policy known as 'community cohesion' and represented a significant securitisation of British society.
This article develops a more specific focus on how Prevent has approached its priority target group of Muslim young people and their educational institutions (DCLG, 2008; HMG, 2011; Home Office, 2014) and the troubling direction of this work. In its initial phase of 2007-2011, Prevent prioritised making contact with young Muslims through youth and community-based settings; more recently, the priority focus has shifted towards formal educational settings of schools, colleges and Universities and is so deepening the problematic features of the programme. Throughout Prevent's history, there has been little evidence of encouragement of and support for educational processes that explicitly build youth resilience against extremism. In particular, I identify here the failure to invest in and trust processes of political and citizenship education for young people that directly address the challenge of extremist ideologies, and which re-enforce processes, standards and embodied values of equal, democratic citizenship. I argue that the absence of such processes of 'educating against extremism ' (Davies, 2008) leaves Prevent unbalanced and tilting heavily toward a securitised engagement with and surveillance of Muslim youth that is now being deepened. Here, Britain's Prevent is misappropriating child protection concepts (Coppock and McGovern, 2014) to increase surveillance of Muslim youth in formal education, an approach normatively justified by the unfolding Syria/Iraq crisis and by political exploitation of moral panics regarding supposed Muslim 'extremist' influence on British state schools (Clarke, 2014; Miah, 2014) .
This article challenges Prevent's approach to youth and instead advocates for human-rights-based citizenship education processes (Osler and Starkey, 2000) , in both schools or community-based settings, that allow controversial political issues to be debated by young people of all backgrounds openly and does so through processes that operationalise and embody the democratic norms and equal citizenship that western states are supposedly defending in the face of domestic and international terrorism. In doing so, it acknowledges that such an educational approach to extremism is in itself controversial, in that this stress on individual, human rights-based citizenship has been portrayed as Eurocentric and in conflict with the more collectivist cultures and values of many minority communities (Kiwan, 2008) . It nevertheless argues that this approach can be a constructive vehicle for addressing racism, Islamophobia and inequality, as well as developing resilience against terrorism. Here, the resilience against extremist ideologies is resilience within and between communities, rather than simply individual. More importantly, the citizenship education approach advocated provides a positive and inclusive basis for policy, rather than the negative and stigmatising approach of Prevent's surveillance system.
To do this, the article first provides a factual overview of the development and approach of Britain's Prevent programme since 2007. It then summarises the key critiques of the Prevent programme per se, critiques that provide the context for the more detailed critical analysis of Prevent's approach to young people and educational institutions that the articles goes on to develop. This enables the article to argue for policy approaches that support, enable and trust educators to develop genuine programmes of anti-extremism education.
Such approaches are, the article argues, the only effective contribution that Prevent and similar policies can make to challenging terrorism and ideologies that support it.
Britain's Prevent programme
The development of Britain's Prevent programme can be charted through two distinct phases. 'Prevent 1' ran from its inception under the-then Labour government in 2007 until the 2011 Prevent Review (HMG, 2011) initiated by the new Coalition government. 'Prevent 2' has run from 2011 to date. Whilst there have been some aspects on continuity within and between these phases, there have also been significant adjustments during each phase. These adjustments partly reflect unexpected events -Britain did not originally envision a domestic threat and so had to rapidly create Prevent in the wake of 7/7 (Hewitt, 2008) ; similarly the radicalising effects of the Syria crisis have provided new challenges. These adjustments also reflect tensions and different perspectives within national government (between different government departments and between different political parties during the [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] Coalition government: Thomas, 2012; , and between the national state and the local government bodies being asked to implement Prevent.
Prevent 1 was rapidly operationalised through an initial 'pathfinder' year of 2007-8 and then significantly expanded between the 2008 and 2011 period (Thomas, 2009; . This development involved funding to all local authority areas having a certain number of Muslim residents via the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), attempts to develop more polyphonic consultation structures with Muslim communities (particularly with women and young people) both nationally and locally, promotion of more 'moderate' forms of Islamic practice through initiatives such as the 'Radical Middle Way' roadshow and over 300 dedicated Police and Counter-Terrorism Unit posts via the security-focused Home Office and its Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT). Together, this programme represented almost £150 million pounds of spending on a programme described as purely being about community engagement, rather than crime detection (Thomas, 2012) . Local authorities took a variety of approaches, with some distributing all monies to Muslim community organisations (Kundnani, 2009) , while others used it to develop their own programmes. A significant priority nationally was developing contact with Muslim young people through youth work (e.g. Lowndes and Thorp, 2010) and the development of Muslim civil society, such as greater training for staff of Mosque schools (Thomas, 2008) .
The rapidly-increasing dominance of the Police in the direction and even delivery of local Prevent work (Thomas, 2014) prompted hostile press coverage, accusations of 'spying' (Kundnani, 2009) 
Prevent -conceptually flawed?
Despite the adjustments to Prevent's approach outlined above, three fundamental conceptual problems can be identified with the programme from its inception to date. They are the way it has approached British Muslims as a single, essentialised community; the contradiction between Prevent and wider policy approaches of community cohesion; and the increasingly securitised nature of a programme supposedly about community engagement and education. Each of these is briefly outlined below.
From the start, Prevent insisted on focussing only on Muslims (DCLG, 2007a and b), with the terror threat portrayed as a problem of Islamic practice and community life, and utilised questionable concepts of 'conveyer belt' journeys to 'radicalisation' (Kundnani, 2012 (Kundnani, 2009, p.24) . Such a frank state focus on British Muslims per se and on leadership and religious interpretation within Muslim communities prompted the allegation that Muslims had replaced the Irish as Britain's 'suspect community' within (Hickman et al, 2010) .This explicit state concern with an essentialised Muslim community was also portrayed as part of a wider moral panic about the new 'folk devils', Muslim young men (Alexander, 2004) , and as part of racism's wider shift to concerns with culture, rather than colour (Hall, 2000) . This Prevent engagement did involve very significant funding for generic community development activity within Muslim communities, and some benefits for Muslim civil society and participation in governance have been identified (O'Toole et al, 2015) . However, this support came from an explicitly anti-terrorism programme. Muslim communities themselves understandably felt stigmatised by such a widespread focus on their entire community being justified through the actions of a handful of individual terrorists (House of Commons, 2010), whilst Prevent 1 explicitly avoided consideration of farright/racist extremism (Thomas, 2012) .Prevent 2 did formally extend the programme's focus to all types of extremism but there is little evidence to date of focus on non-Islamist extremism. A further development of Prevent 2 (HMG, 2013) mentions racism but its recommendations are all about 'oversight of religious supplementary schools' (p.5), 'extremist preachers' (p.6) in Universities and the need for 'Muslim chaplains' in prisons (p.6). The perception that Prevent continues to be about Muslims was highlighted by schools in an area of Britain where far-right racism has been an issue assessing their majority white pupils as 'no risk' and stating that 'staff continue to monitor BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) cohort' (Newman, 2015) .
Community cohesion was the new British policy approach to ethnic relations launched in 2001 following riots in northern towns and cities that largely involved young Muslims. The resulting community cohesion analysis identified ethnic 'parallel lives', ethnic physical and cultural segregation and associated racialized tensions, and the need to overcome these through policy approaches that prioritised commonality, shared values and inter-community contact (Cantle, 2001 ). This was portrayed by many academic commentators as a retreat from multiculturalism and as a re-assertion of assimilationsim in this stress on commonality (Alexander, 2004; Flint and Robinson, 2008) .
However, it is important to identify that many aspects of British multiculturalism have either been created from ground-level upwards, such as multicultural education, or have been significantly mediated and 'enacted' (Braun et al, 2011) by ground-level 'policy practitioners' (Jones, 2013) and front-line professionals. For that reason, the meaning of community cohesion can only be deduced from study of how it has been understood and operationalised at ground level. Here, my previous study (Thomas, 2011) of how youth and community workers in Oldham, Greater Manchester (scene of one of the 2001 riots) were enacting community cohesion showed that they were acknowledging, working with and even celebrating distinct ethnic, faith and social youth identifications but were augmenting them with stronger forms of commonality operationalised through approaches based on 'contact theory' (Hewstone et al, 2007) and utilising a human rights-based conception of complex individual identifications (McGhee, 2006) . This evidence suggested that community cohesion was both a re-naming and a 're-balancing' (Meer and Modood, 2009 ) of multiculturalism, rather than its demise.
Because of the significant ground-level support for this cohesion policy approach (Thomas, 2014) , Prevent was unwanted and seen as a simply contradictory policy by many local authorities, including those in West Yorkshire, home of 7/7 bombers, (Husband and Alam, 2011) . These local authorities fully recognised the domestic terror threat but simply didn't accept that the Prevent strategy was a helpful way forward. Instead, they wanted to tackle extremist ideologies and community tensions through the nonstigmatising policy approach of 'community cohesion' which saw extremism as having fertile ground in segregated monocultural communities. The results of the top-down imposition of Prevent were predictable. Non-Muslim communities displayed a 'virulent envy' (Birt, 2009 ) of the considerable resources directed at Muslims-only, despite government advisers suggesting that ethnic-specific funding was causal to the 2001 riots (Cantle, 2001; Thomas, 2011) and the more general sense of 'unfairness' at the heart of the 'white backlash' (Hewitt, 2005; Thomas and Sanderson, 2013 ) against multiculturalist policy approaches. Whilst under Prevent 1 there was at least comparable support for both community cohesion and Prevent, under Prevent 2 the Coalition government officially ended any national support for, and interest in, community cohesion (or 'integration', as they now termed it: DCLG, 2012), saying this was purely a local matter. Britain now has an increasingly centralised and securitised Prevent strategy and no national cohesion strategy at all (Thomas, 2014 ).
Prevent's central focus on 'radicalisation' and pathways towards it meant that, from early on, counter-terrorism Police became increasingly dominant in local Prevent direction (Bahadur Lamb, 2012) and even direct implementation with communities (Knight, 2010) . This led to two malign effects. Firstly, although the Labour government funded community cohesion on an equal basis until their electoral defeat in 2010, the Police-led Prevent progressively squeezed out cohesion structures and activity at the local level (Thomas, 2014) .
Secondly, this increasing dominance of Prevent over cohesion, and the increasing domination of Police/CTU within Prevent, led to understandable perceptions of spying on Muslim communities and the educational professionals working with those communities (Kundnani, 2009 ).
The Coalition's approach of 'Prevent 2' was not to alter the logic and approach of Prevent but simply to down-size it by reducing the number of funded local authorities. This had the effect of further securitising Prevent by making its overall budget more weighted towards the Police/CTU element and by insisting that all activity carried out by local funded areas had to be approved by the Police/CTU-dominated OSCT in London, so removing local autonomy and the possibility within that of local Muslim community groups demonstrating Prevent leadership. community with sanctions such as school detentions or expulsion from youth projects being deployed for individuals displaying 'racist' views. The effects of such approaches were to cause a racialised resentment, a feeling of unfairness, and to drive racist sentiment underground, rather than enable its educational interrogation. Such white youth resentment was described by Roger Hewitt This led me to suggest previously that Prevent was 'between two stools' (Thomas, 2009) , neither cross-community cohesion work nor actual political education work with young Muslims. This was not surprising, as the history of anti-racist work with white young people was that many youth workers avoided doing it because they felt ill-prepared or supported for such work.
Action research (CRE, 1999; Thomas, 2002) What this Prevent engagement with young Muslims has shown is a similar binary approach to that inherent in the 'clumsy' anti-racism identified by the Burnage Report in to the racist murder of a young Asian student at a Manchester High School (Macdonald, 1989) . There, White young people who were 'racist' had to be policed and sanctioned in to be 'not racist'; young Muslims now showing signs of becoming 'radical' must similarly be surveilled, policed and guided through their 'vulnerability' (see below) towards returning to 'moderation'. This simplistic and binary understanding of youth racism or extremism (or, at least, utterances and actions that appear to be 'extreme') denies the fluid and contingent nature of much youth racism or extremism, as well as the extent to which such language or apparent attitudes can be a performative (Cockburn, 2007) 'Schools appear less confident in their understanding of the Prevent strategy than they are about the statutory duty to promote community cohesion…Confidence appears to be linked to the amount of training received (Phillips et al, 2011, p.12) .
Here, in two thirds of schools surveyed no-one had received training on combatting extremism, directly contributing to a situation where 'only half of schools (49%) use the curriculum to build resistance to violent extremism' (Phillips et al, 2011, p.12 ). An implication here was that an issue as peripheral as anti-extremism could not be interfering with the focus on core curriculum subject and educational 'standards'; This was confirmed by the Coalition government, which officially marginalised Citizenship Studies, the most obvious curriculum vehicle for anti-extremism work, in favour of core academic subjects. They also removed community cohesion from the school inspection framework, so the contrasting, clear understanding of and support for community cohesion in schools found during the previous Labour government (Thomas, 2014) .That educational potential is discussed later in the article. Secondly, it reflects the dominant understanding Prevent holds of how and why some Muslim youth may be attracted toward extremist ideologies and this paradigm and its operationalization with Muslim youth is now discussed. This dominant understanding rests on the 'conveyer belt' theory of radicalisation, the belief that if young people are exposed to 'extreme' political or religious perspectives and groups that espouse them, then they run the grave risk of moving further along the conveyer belt towards actual involvement in extremism. Whilst this model of radicalisation is highly controversial (Kundnani, 2012) in its assumptions about individual motivations and pathways, it has always been central to Prevent and has been strengthened by the Prevent Review's overt foregrounding of a sweeping and ill-defined 'extremism' generally, rather than a more specific violent extremism (HMG, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2012) .
Here, Prevent has consistently views young Muslims as both 'risky and at risk' (Heath-Kelly, 2013); 'risky' in the sense that any young Muslims are potentially a threat to a wider society because the threat is inherent within their essentialised community, and 'at risk' because they may well be 'vulnerable' to being seduced and 'groomed' by this Muslim extremism. This perspective utilises Serderberg's (2003) analogy of terrorism as 'disease', a virus that any young Muslim could catch if we allow them to be exposed to extreme Islamist ideologies and those that perpetuate them. This conception of a predatory threat to vulnerable young Muslims leads to Prevent expropriating and utilising child protection concepts of 'safe-guarding', 'grooming' and 'vulnerability'.
Here:
'dominant administrative discourses of 'child protection' are securitised and deployed to underpin this interventionist ethos and state surveillance practice to produce the 'young British Muslim' as both 'suspect' and in need of being 'saved' ' (Coppock and McGovern, 2014, p.243) .
From this perspective young Muslims are seen to be in need of permanent scrutiny, with a predictably malign impact on the identity management and mental well-being of many young Muslims . Whilst Prevent approaches an entire, essentialised Muslim community as its object of preventative intent, young Muslims are understood as being individually 'vulnerable' to the terrorism disease. Here, any 'radical' behaviour or verbal expression is seen as evidence of exploited vulnerability, rather than of either political agency (Coppock and McGovern, 2014) or performative response to authoritarian discourse (Cockburn, 2007) .
The most tangible evidence of this approach within Prevent has been the 'Channel' multi-agency process of identifying individuals vulnerable to extremism and referring them to approved intervention providers. Whilst at least being based on some tangible criteria for referrals, this represents a controversial 'future crime' approach that requires individuals to participate although no actual crime has yet taken place. This fact, and the significant number of young people under 16 years old referred via Channel in its early phase (HMG, 2011) , means that such an approach would be viewed as unacceptable in many states on civil liberties grounds (Neumann, 2011) 'Whether the very act of focussing on minority cultural expression as a sign of danger may be one of the things that sours the relationship between minority groups, officialdom, and majority society more generally' (Blackwood et al, 2012, p.225) .
These problematic approaches within British education have been hardened and deepened by the so-called 'Trojan Horse' affair (Miah, 2014) , focussed on Muslim-dominated state schools in Birmingham, England's second biggest city.
Here, an anonymous letter (almost certainly fake) led to multiple investigations 'for children's practitioners expected to operationalise these official frameworks, specifically in facilitating the extension of Foucauldian practices of governance and discipline of young British Muslims -practices that may be seen to reproduce and perpetuate institutional anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia' (Coppock and McGovern, 2014, p.243) .
Educating against extremism
The sections above have illustrated how Britain's Prevent strategy has focussed almost exclusively on surveillance of young Muslims, so implicating the educational institutions and professionals working with them, rather than on educational processes that genuinely prevent youth attractions towards extremism and terrorism. In this way, Prevent has failed to learn anything from problematic past attempts in Britain to develop anti-racist education with white young people displaying strong racist feelings. However, examples of how Prevent can and should develop effective anti-extremism education in a non-stigmatising manner also come from past and present approaches to tackling white racism. The Bede House Project (Dadzie, 1996) Clearly, for such an approach to work within youth work settings and within schools and colleges, certain conditions would need to be present. Firstly, the need to critically consider differing life experiences and perspectives so that young people can hear different voices on current political issues, and experience critiques of their own perspective. This understanding stresses that 'cognitive dissonance is essential in learning, whether about religion or anything else ' (ibid, p.134) and that political/citizenship education has to be genuinely experiential -it needs to involve hearing, analysing and debating genuinely different perspectives -for it to be successful. This approach to 'educating against extremism' argues that it is better to enable young people to voice their feelings, even supposedly extremist or racist ones, so that they can be interrogated and considered. For Gus John, education needs to urgently create :
'A safe environment where young people can openly share their views, however abhorrent, and have their views subjected to rigorous and informed challenge and debate ' (2014, p. 2) .
In an era when such views, and much more extreme versions of them, are readily available to anyone with an internet connection, it is vital that young people are enabled to develop the skills of considering the content, sources
and trustworthiness of what they read and hear, and how to find alternative information and perspectives. As the very mixed experience of anti-racist education highlighted (CRE, 1999; Thomas, 2002) , the skills and confidence of educational practitioners is crucial to such anti-extremist education:
'Skills and confidence need to be developed towards teaching controversial issues and analysing discourse' (Davies, 2008, p.140 ).
Yet, currently, Prevent is not encouraging or enabling this type of educational process for educational practitioners. One way forward for schools would be an enhanced focus on citizenship education (Osler, 2000) . As community cohesion initially developed under the past Labour government, citizenship education was seen as a vital component before being side-lined. Citizenship education within British (or at least English, given Britain's increasingly complex and devolved national state) education in the modern era is closely connected with the 1998 Report 'Education for Citizenship and the teaching of Democracy in Schools' by Sir Bernard Crick. This directly led to the Citizenship component within the national school curriculum. Key for this report was political literacy, gained through experiential pedagogical approaches (Spencer, 2000) , amongst young people but, 'in practice, many schools have avoided political and structural questions when dealing with the here and now' (Osler and Starkey, 2000, p.12) . This 'participatory model' at the heart of Crick's proposals was directly connected to the issue of how shared values and sense of citizenship can be built in a rapidly changing, multicultural society:
'Just as a sense of belonging or identity may promote participation, the experience of participating can enhance a sense of belonging' (Kiwan, 2008, p. x).
This perspective emphasises that citizenship education is not just about 'horizontal' relationships and respect for 'other' communities but is also about 'vertical' relationships between citizen and the state -the sense that the individual young citizen has real rights as well as responsibilities, some influence over and say in the actions of the state, and has a lived experience of legal and political equality (Kiwan, 2008) .Here, though, it must be acknowledged that the human rights-focussed approach of citizenship education, the approach advocated by Davies (2008) as the best educational response to extremist threats, is significantly contested. The individualist model of citizenship inherent in human rights-based approaches can arguably marginalise the experiences and perspectives of minority communities. For Kiwan, such approaches 'do not allow for a critical dialogue between the dominant and minority communities ' (2008, p.16) or necessarily enable distinct identities and experiences to be acknowledged and empowered. This echoes Modood's (2013) caution that overly-secular state approaches will inevitably alienate minority communities, especially Muslims, to whom collective religious identification is a priority. Davies (2008) , though, argues that her 'educating against extremism' approach means that confronting social injustice, racism and inequality is integral through processes that acknowledge the strength and reality of group identities and experiences. Here, citizenship education works with these identities but also augments them and so implicitly de-centres them in the same way as the community cohesion youth practice discussed above (Thomas, 2011) .
Central to debates around the nature and content of citizenship education in Britain has been the concept of 'shared values', so demonstrating its close connection to debates around community cohesion (Cantle, 2001 ). In the wake of the 2001 riots and the 7/7 London bombing, there was much talk of 'British values' and this has now been re-energised following the Trojan Horse affair. Now, all state schools are required to promote 'fundamental British values' (Richardson and Bolloten, 2014) , but defining what is 'British' about such values is highly problematic, even before Britain's controversial past and present world role is considered. For Davies:
'What is needed is a properly 'ecumenical' and universal value system, and I would argue that the 'best fit' is to be found in human rights ' (2008, p.159 ).
This perspective emphasises that young people have rights now, not just when they reach voting age, that they also have responsibilities and that these rights belong to them individually, not to their community 'leaders'. More importantly, human rights is an ethical system, not a belief system, and its use within genuine programmes of overt, anti-extremist education would decisively foreground the rights and responsibilities that all people, no matter what their background, belief system or political persuasion, must abide by in a democratic, diverse society.
Conclusion
The above discussions have attempted to illustrate just how much Britain's Prevent has focussed on young Muslims, yet how little educational content there has been within its programmes. In focussing on Muslims as an essentialised community, Prevent is clearly contradictory to community cohesion. By focussing on an entire Muslim community, Prevent inherently stigmatises and risks hardening defensive and identifications within Muslim youth, as clumsy anti-racism did with some white communities previously. It also shows no signs of learning the lessons from those previous attempts to develop anti-racist education. Prevent, through its conveyer belt theory of radicalisation, appears to replicate the simplistic binary of racist/not racist that fatally undermined many approaches to anti-racist education. Here, there is no sense of youth (racist/extremist) attitudes being fluid, conditional or even performative (Cockburn, 2007) , and no apparent understanding of identifications as multiple and contingent. The characterisation of the scale and urgency of the terrorist threat (itself highly contentious in relation to other social threats that young people face) means that genuine processes of education are seen as a luxury that Prevent cannot afford, whilst the supposed vulnerability to radicalisation is simply portrayed as an individual one from which individual young Muslims must be safe-guarded.
These malign understandings have combined to leave Prevent as being all about securitised surveillance and failing to develop a meaningful component of 'educating against extremism ' (Davies, 2008) . However, given the ready availability of extremist material via the internet and the chronic reality of the international conflicts and national inequalities driving narratives of community grievance, there has never been a more important time to invest in programmes of political education with youth that not only educate about equal democratic citizenship but which embody its principles, norms and values. Only through such citizenship education, with a human rights framework at its core, will young people be equipped with the individual and peer group resilience to examine and reject ideologies that promote hatred and violence. The current, counter-productive situation of securitised surveillance being prioritised by Britain's Prevent programme, and the apparent acceptance of this reality by British educationalists, suggests that terrorism may be winning after all.
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